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The Gender of Judges
Suzanna Sherry*
The breadth and variety of the topics discussed at the 1985
NAWJ Convention raise a troubling question: is there any longer a
need for an association of women law judges? While a few of the
discussions center around "women's issues,"1 most do not. Such
diverse papers as Judicial Performance Evaluation and Manage-
ment of Complex Litigation would be equally appropriate for a
symposium of gender-unspecified judges. This suspicion of obso-
lescence is not limited to an association of women judges; I have
heard similar observations about various formal and informal as-
sociations of women law professors and women lawyers, and I sus-
pect that the same question arises in any field women have
recently but successfully integrated. As long as women are a be-
leaguered minority, all-female associations are easily explained
and justified by the need to share the special concerns that arise
from minority status. As those concerns diminish, however, such
associations become apparently more difficult to justify.
An association of women judges is defensible, however, if wo-
men judges differ significantly enough from male judges to provide
a unique asset to the judicial enterprise. That uniqueness can then
be nurtured by the give-and-take of annual meetings, and the par-
ticipants might then continue to contribute even more when they
return to the community at large. This essay suggests that women
judges are identifiably distinct from their male cohorts in three
ways. Women judges make a unique contribution to the legal sys-
tem by their presence, their participation, and their perspective.
The first two of these aspects of the feminization of the judiciary
may decrease in significance as discrimination wanes, but the in-
fluence of a feminine perspective is independent of the existence
of gender discrimination. Thus, I will briefly discuss the contribu-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B., 1976, Middle-
bury College; J.D., 1979, University of Chicago.
1. See Edward Donnerstein, Cheryl Champion, Cass Sunstein & Catharine
MacKinnon, Pornography: Social Science, Legal, and Clinical Perspectives, 4 Law
& Inequality 17 (1986); Marilyn Loftus, Lynn Hecht Schafran & Norma Wikler, Es-
tablishing a Gender Bias Task Force, in id. at 103 [hereinafter cited as Gender
Bias]; Patricia Wald, The Role of Morality in Judging: A Woman Judge's Perspec-
tive, in id. at 3.
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tion women judges make by their presence and their participation,
and then address in more depth the feminine perspective. By the
"feminine perspective," I do not mean the political agenda associ-
ated with feminism, but rather a distinctly feminine way of look-
ing at the world. A feminist perspective is an ideology that
encompasses the belief that men and women should have equal
roles in society, but does not necessarily reach other aspects of the
social or political structure. A feminine perspective, on the other
hand, encompasses all aspects of society, whether or not they af-
fect men and women differently.
Presence
The mere presence of women on the bench serves an educa-
tive function. Observing a woman in judicial robes helps shatter
the stereotypes held by male judges, and by lawyers and law stu-
dents of both genders. Additionally, judges occupy a highly visible
position of authority, and the example set by women judges
reaches far beyond the legal profession. Those non-lawyers who
come into direct contact with women judges-as litigants, jurors,
and witnesses-absorb a subtle but direct lesson about the role of
women in our society. Even those who never enter a courtroom
are aware of women judges through newspapers and the broadcast
media. Members of the NAWJ thus contribute daily to the organi-
zation's demise by altering the circumstances which create its ini-
tial raison d'&tre.
Participation
Women's participation in the adjudicative process also
reduces discrimination in a much more concrete way. A recent
study in New Jersey indicates that women are not yet obtaining
equal justice from our courts. Gender bias influences the outcome
of litigation on everything from ordinary damage awards to di-
vorce and custody disputes.2 While there are, of course, many
male judges who eschew gender-based decision making, women's
experiences as women give them greater empathy and insight into
women's problems. Although both men and women may-at an
unconscious level-accept some of society's sexist ideology, women
have a greater incentive to overcome their own unconscious gen-
der bias: membership in a victimized group confers an additional
ability and impetus to identify and combat the most subtle forms
2. New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts (1984).
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that victimization might take.3 Thus we can expect that an influx
of women into the judiciary will result in a corresponding decrease
in gender-biased decision making. Indeed, another article in this
symposium offers specific strategies for reducing gender bias in the
legal system.4 Whether all women would agree with those particu-
lar strategies is unimportant: what matters is that some judges are
now addressing the previously unasked question of what to do
about gender discrimination in the legal system.
That women judges will be better able to respond to various
overt and covert forms of gender discrimination is more than a
speculative hypothesis. Justice O'Connor, despite her generally
conservative political beliefs, is considerably more sympathetic to
claims of gender discrimination than are her equally conservative
brethren.5 Moreover, the feminization of the judiciary may con-
tribute to the elimination of gender bias in the legal system not
only by enforcing equal rights, as O'Connor tends to do, but also
by recognizing that women's different perspective can create dif-
ferent needs. A dispute between Judge Patricia Wald (a contribu-
tor to this symposium) and two of her brethren on the D.C. Circuit
illustrates how her greater receptivity to the existence of a femi-
nine perspective makes her better able to protect women's rights.
Judge Wald was the sole dissenter in Steele v. FCC.6 In
Steele, the FCC had awarded a competitive radio frequency to a fe-
male applicant in preference to a similarly-situated male applicant,
on the ground that female ownership would enhance programming
diversity. The D.C. Circuit reversed the award and invalidated the
FCC's female preference policy. The two male judges in the ma-
jority rejected the notion that gender could be related to diversity:
Women transcend ethnic, religious, and other cultural barri-
ers. In their social and political opinions and beliefs, for exam-
ple, women in fact appear to be just as divided among
themselves as are men. Therefore it is not reasonable to ex-
3. See David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing from Feminist Ju-
risprudence and Critical Theory, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 59, 81 (1985) (women are
more self-reflective because of their "marginal" position in society).
4. Gender Bias, supra note 1, at 103.
5. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Arizona Gov-
erning Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). See generally
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1986); Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of
Justice O'Connor, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 389, 455-56 (1985). It would be interesting to
study comparisons among other judges on gender discrimination issues, to see if wo-
men are consistently more likely to remedy such discrimination than are men of
similar background.
6. 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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pect that a woman would manifest a distinctly "female" edito-
rial viewpoint. 7
Judge Wald, in contrast, found the FCC's assumption of a connec-
tion between a station owner's gender and the station's program-
ming quite reasonable:
As the majority quite correctly states, women are not uniform
in their choices of lifestyle, or their political, social or moral
beliefs.... The point is not that [women] have some cohesive,
collective viewpoint. Certainly Phyllis Schafly and Eleanor
Smeal differ on most issues related to women; what they
share, however, is their awareness that women as a group are
currently facing critical issues. The nexus between diversity of
control and diversity of content concerns such things as the se-
lection of topics for coverage in news, editorials, and program-
ming, the emphasis accorded to the issues, and the fairness
with which the issues are presented .... 8
Thus the recognition of the existence of a feminine perspective-
regardless of the substantive content of that perspective-some-
times enhances the contribution that women judges can make in
their decisions. Women's participation seems to feed upon itself: it
takes a female scholar to recognize that it takes a female judge to
recognize that it takes a female radio station owner to recognize
women's needs in programming. Thus women's participation in
each of the enterprises reinforces the value of their participation
in each of the other enterprises. 9
As society becomes less discriminatory, however, there will
be a diminishing need for women as role models or as influential
representatives of women's interests. Moreover, there is an unset-
tling limit to the participation rationale: it seems to justify female
participation only in those disciplines that have identifiable "wo-
men's issues." A female mathematician, for example, seems not to
be contributing anything unique (except to the extent she is a role
model). The legal community itself offers a sharp illustration of
the limitations of the participation rationale. For many years, wo-
men in both practice and teaching were channelled into "women's
areas" such as family law and discrimination law.10 Even now, wo-
men who teach corporation law or tax law are often asked why
they don't teach more gender-oriented subjects. An adequate de-
7. Id. at 1199.
8. Id. at 1209.
9. This chain also raises an interesting question: will women readers be more
receptive to the theories propounded in the text? One admittedly fuzzy piece of ev-
idence suggests they will: whenever I have propounded bits of virtue-based political
or moral theory to my classes (without labeling it as such), women seem much
more willing than men to accept it.
10. See, e.g., Donna Fossum, Women Law Professors, 1980 A.B.F. Research J.
903, 911-13; James White, Women in the Law, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1051, 1063 (1967).
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scription of the feminization of a discipline must therefore de-
scribe women's contribution to the discipline as based on more
than presence and participation.
Perspective
In ground-breaking studies on the development of moral sen-
sibility in men and women, Carol Gilligan has provided an empiri-
cal basis for describing such a contribution."1 Her work suggests
that men and women tend to develop different perspectives on the
world and different ways of thinking about themselves and their
relationship to the world. Where men see themselves as funda-
mentally autonomous and independent of others, women instead
see themselves as fundamentally connected: women are essentially
members of communities, men are individuals who happen to live
in communities. This dichotomous view of the self, of course, re-
sults in divergent descriptions of relationships between selves, and
disparate theories of how disputes between individuals ought to be
resolved. Gilligan found that women tend to resolve such disputes
less abstractly and more contextually than do men: a problem can
never be divorced from the context in which it arises. In contrast,
men resolve disputes by resort to abstract rights and universal
norms.
The notion of abstract rights is a quintessential example of
disregarding context. Rights are never described by reference to a
particular individual, with identifiable needs and attributes, but
only by reference to what Justice Harlan called a "cipher": an
empty, fungible being who can be plugged into any legal equa-
tion.12 Because rights are abstract and universal, they can tran-
scend individual choices. A necessary concomitant of
universalizable rules, however, is a pluralist political structure. In
order to avoid unresolvable conflicts between different individuals'
value structures, a rights-based political system must abjure any
official preference for specific values, instead opting for protection
of each individual's right to structure his own value system. A
rights-based system thus accommodates competing visions of the
good life without choosing among them. As Ronald Dworkin puts
it, a rights-based society "must not constrain liberty on the ground
11. Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (1982); see also Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering:
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mer-
maid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and the Human Malaise (1976). As
Patricia Wald notes, judicial decision making is intimately intertwined with moral-
ity, both individual and societal. Wald, supra note 1, at 3.
12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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that one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler
or superior to another's."13
A feminine society, by contrast, makes decisions based on
what is right under the circumstances, not on who has rights in
the abstract. One important consequence of this rejection of ab-
stractions is that such a society will have to decide what is right, to
make value choices and choose among competing visions of the
good life. Defining virtue can no longer be done at the individual
level: a feminine society is a virtuous society in the sense that it
cannot be pluralist.
Imagine a dispute between those who believe adultery is im-
moral and those who do not. A rights-based society resolves the
issue by determining-according to previously specified rules for
defining rights'4-whether adultery, or laws against it, violate any-
one's rights. Of course the process will not be simple and will in-
volve significant disputes: What are this society's rules of rights?
Does emotional harm to an adulterer's spouse count? Does the ed-
ucative influence on other people's children count? One question
no one will ask is whether the conduct should be regulated in or-
der to promote the potential adulterer's individual virtue, because
a pluralist society cannot make that value choice. Every actor is
responsible for his own virtue unless another's rights are at stake.
A virtue-based society approaches the question differently. In-
stead of asking whether there is harm to the adulterer's spouse, it
asks whether there is harm to the adulterer's virtue. The answer
to that question will come from a weaving together of the commu-
nity's traditions and aspirations with creativity and compassion,
and it will be explicitly and unashamedly a value choice.
What happens when a contextual, virtue-based woman meets
the abstract, rights-based male world? She changes the shape of
that world. In almost every discipline, women are integrating
their feminine perspective into a previously male world view. Wo-
men writers and literary critics are finding voices and telling tales
in which relationships between characters may take precedence
over development of character, and characters are unwilling to dif-
ferentiate universal principles from particular applications.15 Fe-
13. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 273 (1977).
14. Examples of a "right-defining rule" might be that every individual has the
greatest amount of freedom compatible with a similar amount of freedom for all, or
that rights must be accorded so as to increase (or at least not to decrease) the lib-
erty or welfare of the least fortunate members of society. Cf. Robert Nozick, Anar-
chy State and Utopia (1974) (adopting a version of the first example); John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice (1975) (adopting a version of the second example).
15. See, e.g., Contemporary Women Novelists: A Collection of Critical Essays
(Patricia Meyer ed. 1977); Sandra Gilbert & Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the
[Vol. 4:159
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male philosophers are reconciling those universal principles with
their particular applications by describing the allegedly nonexis-
tent category of "concrete universals": transcendent human es-
sences that are explicitly located in space and time.16 Even the
natural sciences have not escaped the masculine distortion: women
in these fields are beginning to identify theories and approaches
that are distinctively masculine, and to develop feminine
responses.17
The feminine emphasis on connection and contextuality
might similarly transform law. Independent of political philoso-
phy, a feminine perspective grounded on contextuality and com-
munity yields different approaches and different results in many
areas of law-including areas both within and without the feminist
agenda of "women's issues." Justice O'Connor, for example, is
"conservative" on law and order issues,' 8 but considerably closer to
"liberal" when it comes to race discrimination 19 or establishment
of religion.20 These conflicting positions are reconcilable if she is
Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination (1979);
The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women and Literary Theory (Elaine
Showalter ed. 1985); Writing and Sexual Difference (Elizabeth Abel ed. 1982); Louis
Gould, Life After Radcliffe, N.Y. Times Book Review, Sept. 23, 1984, § 7, at 9. See
generally Sherry, supra note 5.
16. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philos-
ophy (1978); Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970); Discovering Reality:
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy
of Science (Sandra Harding & Merrill Hintikka eds. 1983); Women and Philosophy:
Toward A Theory of Liberation (Carol Gould & Marx Wartofsky eds. 1976);
Drucilla Cornell, Toward A Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 291 (1985). See generally Sherry, supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., Evelyn Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (1985); Elizabeth
Kulbert, Scientific Ideas: Men's Vs. Women's, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at 19. For
an example of the difference a feminine perspective can make in scientific endeav-
ors, see Barbara Sherry & Roland Rueckert, Evidence for at Least Two Dominant
Neutralization Antigens on Human Rhinovirus 14, 53 J. Virology 137 (1985) (dem-
onstrating that rhinoviruses have numerous antigen-specific sites: antigen reaction
is thus a particular, not an abstract, process).
18. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984); Anderson v.
Fuller, 455 U.S. 1028 (1982). See generally Robert Riggs, Justice O'Connor: A First
Term Appraisal, 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19-26; Comment, supra note 5, at 437-447
(1985).
19. For example, compare O'Connor's position with Rehnquist's in the follow-
ing cases: Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S.
255 (1982). See generally Sherry, supra note 5.
20. For example, compare O'Connor's position with Rehnquist's in the follow-
ing cases: Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914
(1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116 (1982). See generally Sherry, supra note 5.
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taken to reject masculine protection of individual rights in favor of
a feminine focus on community. Protecting the rights of criminal
defendants can be viewed as harming the community, and is justi-
fied primarily by a vision of rights as paramount. Dismantling the
barriers erected by race discrimination or religious favoritism, on
the other hand, serves to protect a particular type of individual
right: the right to full membership in the community. Thus the
feminine perspective on the rights of criminal defendants inter-
sects with the conservative masculine approach, in that both are
reluctant to protect individual rights at the expense of community
interests. The feminine perspective on racial and religious dis-
crimination intersects instead with the liberal masculine results.
In the latter case, however, the results are reached through differ-
ent routes: the feminine perspective rejects discrimination because
of its impact on community membership, and the liberal perspec-
tive rejects discrimination as an ordinary violation of principles of
individual rights.21 Thus women judges, operating under a distinc-
tive paradigm, may reach results that are not predictable by refer-
ence solely to their ordinary political preferences.
A feminine perspective may also operate at a deeper level to
influence the process of decision making or lawmaking itself. Two
examples drawn from this symposium are illustrative. The debate
over antipornography legislation has often been characterized as a
feminist dispute, but it may also be seen as a feminine dispute in
the following way. Pornography's primary effect is educative in
the sense that it instructs and influences the morality (and thus
perhaps the behavior) of its readers. The most persuasive reason
for restricting it, then, is disagreement with its underlying moral-
ity. Pornography conveys a view of women that is simply immoral.
For the government to make such a value choice-to say, in effect,
that a virtuous or moral community should not allow the propaga-
tion of immoral material-is quite consistent with the value-based
feminine political vision but inconsistent with the value-neutral
masculine political vision. The antipornography legislation thus
exemplifies the conflict between a feminine morality and the mas-
culine legal structure, insofar as restrictions on pornography mesh
more easily into a virtue-based structure than into a rights-based
structure.
More significantly, the antipornography legislation itself
seems to suffer from a disjunction: despite its feminine underpin-
nings of value choice and virtue, it is cast in the masculine lan-
21. For an elaboration of the feminine aspects of Justice O'Connor's jurispru-
dence, see Sherry, supra note 5.
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guage of rights and justified on the masculine ground of the harm
it causes to other individuals (rather than on the ground of its im-
morality).22 This disjunction undermines any justification for the
legislation under either perspective. From the masculine perspec-
tive of abstract rights, the right of free speech is likely to prevail
over the rights of women who are harmed by it, because the harm
to the latter is neither sufficiently immediate nor sufficiently cer-
tain. The feminine perspective affords a better justification for the
antipornography legislation, but there is not yet an underlying
feminine first amendment jurisprudence, and thus the feminine
aspects of the legislation conflict too sharply with established law.
In particular, the notion that the government may make ideologi-
cal or moral value choices about what citizens may read clashes
with our established (masculine) first amendment jurisprudence.
What is needed is a theory of the first amendment based on con-
textual morality. The complete absence of such a value-based the-
ory, and the poverty of the justifications offered for the legislation
under the neutral rights model, have thus far combined to deal ul-
timate defeat to the antipornography legislation everywhere it has
been proposed.23
Judge Wald's contribution to this symposium offers another
example of the potential scope of a feminine perspective on law.
Most obviously, of course, Judge Wald takes as her starting prem-
ise that men and women do view human interactions in different
ways. In the context of techniques of constitutional interpretation,
she thus concludes that originalism necessarily fails to take ac-
count of women's perspective, since none of the Framers were fe-
male. She and Karst,24 however, like many others who have
written about women and the law, seem implicitly to limit wo-
men's contribution as judges and lawmakers to "women's issues."25
Her primary justification for rejecting originalism is thus that
male constitution-writers are not attuned to women's needs.
It is in the fact of her rejection of originalism, however,
rather than her justification for that rejection, that Judge Wald
22. See Catharine MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 321
(1984); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 28.
23. It has been defeated by mayoral veto in Minneapolis, by voter rejection in
Cambridge, and by judicial invalidation in Indianapolis. As of this writing, no femi-
nist antipornography legislation has been successfully adopted by any other city.
24. Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 Duke L.J. 447.
25. See, e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women 's
Rights in a Man's World, 2 Law & Inequality 33, 51-52 (1984); Ann Freedman, Sex
Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913, 965-68 (1983);
Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture. Courts. and
Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 175 n.2 (1982).
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most intriguingly illuminates the feminine perspective I have been
describing. She admits that abandonment of originalism leaves
"very few road maps" 26 for judicial decision making. Her own de-
scription of how judges should make difficult constitutional deci-
sions without resorting to originalism raises interesting questions.
She advocates a creative weaving of "our own intellectual and
moral resources .... our respect for precedent, the letter and the
spirit, and our appraisal of the strength and the vulnerability of
the legal and social structure of which we are a part."27 Even con-
stitutional interpretation, in her view, requires proper attention to
values ("moral resources") and context ("the legal and social
structure"). While this theory of interpretation is not confined to
women judges (or women scholars), a feminine perspective may be
uniquely suited to resolving the problems that arise once a position
of contextual decision making is adopted.
The problem with a jurisprudence grounded on contextuality
and value choices is that it lacks constraints. If virtuous behavior
can be coercively required, it is a short step to requiring vicious be-
havior. What is to stop a society from deciding that virtue encom-
passes different behavior depending on gender or race? Using
contextual value choices to resolve disputes requires empathy or
unity between the decision maker and the other participants, or it
becomes simply an exercise of raw, unconstrained power. As
Duncan Kennedy has suggested in discussing the virtue of pater-
nalistic statutes, making formally unconstrained decisions on
someone else's behalf may be appropriate in a private context, but
is too subject to abuse in a public context.28 An illustration of such
abuse may be found in the Supreme Court's long history of up-
holding statutes that discriminate against women on paternalistic
grounds.29 The liberal fear is that a virtue-based jurisprudence
will degenerate into a random system based on moral principles
that are "plural, conflicting, and open to the influence of [judges']
personal moral beliefs."30 Is it possible for a society to be caring
without being coercive?
26. Wald, supra note 1, at 13.
27. Id.
28. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 646-49 (1982).
29. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Goesart v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See gen-
erally David Kirp, Mark Yudof, & Marlene Franks, Gender Justice 31-36 (1986)
(historical survey of paternalism).
30. Stephen Macedo, The Public Morality of the Rule of Law: A Critique of Ron-
ald Dworkin, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 79, 87 (1985). The radical response to the
fear is that the degeneration is inevitable and has already occurred.
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There are three responses that a feminine scholar can make:
the first two depend on process and the last on substance. To the
extent that women themselves participate in the judicial enter-
prise, they will prevent gender-biased abuse of the opportunities
contextual decision making provides. Thus the participation of wo-
men as judges operates on one level-within either the masculine
or the feminine paradigm-to constrain the gender-directed harms
of the system. Representative institutions need little constraint.
The operation of the feminine paradigm, moreover, also suggests
another procedural constraint on non-originalist decision making.
Because women are more naturally connected to others, they are
more likely to be governed by true empathy: paternalism grounded
not on power, but on the sort of equation of self and other that
causes a driver to fling her arm across the passenger seat when she
comes to a sudden stop. Increasing the likelihood of proper moti-
vation decreases the likelihood of abuse.
A more substantive response is that tolerance is a virtue. Pa-
ternalism can be tempered by a willingness to accept as valid view-
points other than one's own. To the extent that tolerance is a
value under a feminine morality-as the metaphor of the web sug-
gests it is-a feminine jurisprudence contains its own constraints
in the same way that a jurisprudence of abstract rights or neutral
principles does. Such a jurisprudence of virtue does not yet exist
in any developed form, but the influx of women into the legal
community, and their formal and informal interactions with each
other and with their male colleagues, are necessary steps in its
development.
1986]

